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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether plaintiff came forward with competent

evidence showing a triable issue of fact that asphalt sealant
was making the parking lot slippery at the time plaintiff fell.
2.

Whether given the undisputed facts of this case,

the trial court correctly concluded that defendant neither knew
nor should have known that asphalt sealant was making the
parking lot slippery.
In determining whether there were genuine issues of
fact, the Court does not defer to the trial court's ruling; it
reviews the facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the losing party. Hamblin v. City of
Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1990); Canfield v.
Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah App. 1992).

When

there are no disputed issues of material fact, a challenge to
summary judgment presents only questions of law that are
reviewed for correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d
999, 1004 (Utah 1994) .

In determining whether the trial court

drew the right conclusion from undisputed facts, the Court
looks at whether "only one conclusion" can be drawn from the
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undisputed facts. Silcox v. Skaacrs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P. 2d
623, 624 (Utah App. 1991).
STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiff slipped and fell while walking in the rain
at Little America. (R.2)

Originally, plaintiff contended that

she slipped on oil or automotive grease in the parking lot.
(R.24 8)

When we informed her that eight months prior to the

accident the asphalt had been treated with a sealant, she
changed her theory and said there was no oil or grease; it was
the sealant that made the asphalt unreasonably slippery.
(RR.224-25)
We waited for plaintiff to finish her discovery1 and
moved for summary judgment. (R.61)

We moved for summary

judgment because (1) there was no evidence that the sealant was
making the asphalt slippery when wet and (2) there was no
evidence that Little America knew or should have known that the
sealant was making the asphalt slippery when wet. (RR.83-88)
In support of the motion, we adduced a number of facts (RR.7883) that are set forth in the following Statement of Facts of
this brief.
Plaintiff attempted to put those facts at issue with
an affidavit from Charles Turnbow. (R.142)

x

Mr. Turnbow is an

Two sets of requests for admission, four sets of requests
for production of documents, five sets of interrogatories and
thirteen depositions.
161V47654 1
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attorney and professional engineer. (R.148)

He claimed to be

an expert in "slip and fall cases." (R.143)

He did not visit

Little America or conduct any tests of its asphalt or the
sealant that was used on its asphalt.

After reviewing the

pleadings and depositions in this case (RR.143-45), he rendered
the following opinion:

"For a period of time following the

application of asphalt sealant of the general kind applied by
defendant in or about August 1990, the surface to which the
sealant is applied will be 'slippery when wet.'" (R.145)
We complained about a number of deficiencies in Mr.
Turnbow's affidavit and made them the subject of a motion to
strike. (RR.187, 198-99)

First, there appeared to be no

foundation for his conclusion -- Though Mr. Turnbow boasts a
background in chemistry, he failed to identify any experience
with asphalt sealant.

Second, Mr. Turnbow failed to state any

facts in support of his conclusion -- What is it about asphalt
sealant that makes it "slippery when wet"?

Third, the

conclusion was irrelevant -- Mr. Turnbow failed to state that
the sealant was making the asphalt slippery when wet eight
months after its application.

Fourth, Mr. Turnbow said nothing

about the critical issue of how we were supposed to know,
assuming it were true, that the sealant was making the asphalt
slippery when wet eight months after its application.

161V47654 1
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The trial court did not formally rule on our motion
to strike.

However, the Minute Entry granting our motion for

summary judgment said the following about Mr. Turnbow's
affidavit:
The fact that any asphalt is somewhat more
slippery when wet than when dry is common
knowledge....To that knowledge the
affidavit of the plaintiff's expert Turnbow
adds nothing. In addition the Court is of
the opinion that many of Mr. Turnbow's
opinions are based on information the
source of which and the reliability of
which is not revealed within his affidavit.
(R.220)(emphasis added).
In addition to the affidavit of Charles Turnbow,
plaintiff attempted to create a factual issue with the
testimony of a lawyer named Bruce Parker (who was accompanying
plaintiff on her trip). (R.170)

Mr. Parker claimed to have

slipped in the rain (R.173), but he admitted making no report
of the incident to Little America. (R.816, LL.19-20)

Mr.

Parker reported that another lawyer in the group slipped and
fell in the rain. (R.173)
objected. (R.190)

This of course was hearsay, and we

But we deemed it immaterial since Mr. Parker

admitted there was no report of the incident to Little America.
(R.819, LL.20-23)
Plaintiff attempted to create a factual issue by
testifying that two weeks after the incident, a Little America
"employee" reported to her that slip and fall incidents
161X47654 1

- 4 -

happened "all the time" at Little America. (R.184)

Plaintiff's

testimony lacked foundation (and we objected) (R.192) because
plaintiff never identified the employee (R.574, LL.22-25,
R.575, LL.1-4).2
Finally, plaintiff attempted to create a factual
issue with the label from the sealant can.

The label from the

can read as follows:
This is a protective coating for asphalt
pavements.... It is recommended for
driveways, parking lots, tennis courts,
school playgrounds and other bituminous
pavement surfaces.
Driveway Coating may be applied at all
temperatures above freezing. It must be
rolled on the surface using a medium-toheavy nap roller.
Roll coating on evenly, working into pores.
Apply as thinly as possible, covering
surface. On smooth pavement, fine silica
sand may be broadcast into wet coating to
increase non-slip characteristics. (R.136)
The trial court granted our motion for summary
judgment because plaintiff failed to adduce any competent
evidence that Little America knew or should have known that the
sealant was making the asphalt slippery at the time she fell.
(R.221)

On this appeal, we contend that the trial court should

be affirmed for the additional reason that plaintiff never

2

We even tried to help her by identifying everyone who was
on duty the day in question. (R.373)
161X47654 1

adduced any competent evidence that the sealant was in fact
making the asphalt slippery at the time she fell.3
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These are the facts we adduced in support of our
summary judgment motion:
1.

Plaintiff, who was a guest at defendant's Little

America Hotel, slipped and fell on wet asphalt while walking
from the main lobby to one of the outside lodges. (R.2)
2.

It was raining at the time of the incident,

though not as hard as earlier that day. (R.484, LL.19-23;
R.489, LL.9-19)
3.

Plaintiff experienced no problem with slipping

until at the precise location where she fell. (R.490, LL.7-14)
4.

More than eight months prior to the incident

(August, 1990), defendant treated the asphalt at Little America
with a gilsonite-based asphalt sealant. (R.862, LL.2-9; R.893,
LL.9-11)
5.

Defendant had done this many times before, and

the last time was in 1988. (R.866, LL.3-6; R.867, LL.12-15)

3

By her clever juxtaposition of the first full sentences
on page 3 of her brief, plaintiff makes it seem that defendant
has acknowledged the sealant was making the asphalt slippery at
the time she fell. Defendant has acknowledged that as a matter
of common knowledge asphalt surfaces are slippery when wet.
Defendant denies (and plaintiff has yet to prove) that the
sealant was making the asphalt slippery at the time she fell.
161V47654 1
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6.

There were no "problems" with the treatment in

1988 (R.913, LL.25), and the treatment in 1990 was "virtually
identical" to the one in 1988. (R.866, LL. 14-19)
7.

There were no reported incidents on the asphalt

for the two years following the treatment in 1988 or for the
eight months following the treatment in 1990.4
8.

On April 25, 1991, a woman named Sandra Walraven

slipped and fell on the asphalt. (R.741, LL.15-25; R.749,
LL.20-25, R.750, LL.1-2)
9.

It was "raining pretty hard" at the time. (R.745,

LL.22-25)
10.

Ms. Walraven reported the incident to a Little

America security officer who wrote it up in an Incident Report.
(R.760, LL.11-25; R.985, LL.24-25, R.986, LL.4-16; R.1116)
11.

The Incident Report makes no mention of the

asphalt being "slick" or "slippery," it simply reports that Ms.
Walraven fell "while it was raining." (R.1116)
12.

Ms. Walraven remembers telling the security

officer that "it was raining, the pavement was slick, and I
fell." (R.762, LL.2-3)

4

In response to plaintiff's discovery (R.231), we produced
"Incident Reports" for all slip and falls that had occurred on
Little America asphalt since December 31, 1986. There were
four such incidents (RR.233-36), and the first occurred on
April 25, 1991 (R.236), more than eight months after the last
application of asphalt sealant.
161X47654 1
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13.

Ms. Walraven did not immediately report the

incident; she went to the hotel restaurant for a cup of coffee.
(R.786, LL.19-24)
14.

Ms. Walraven admitted that the only reason she

reported the incident is because her foot started hurting while
having coffee. (R.786, L.25, R.787, LL.1-4)
15.

Ms. Walraven admitted that she would not have

reported the incident if her foot had not started hurting.
(R.787, LL.7-13)
16.

The first complaint about "wet, very slick

pavement" came in a letter from Ms. Walraven dated May 7, 1991.
(R.774, LL.22-25, R.775, LL.1-13; Exhibit 4)

This was days

after plaintiff's incident.
17.

Before this lawsuit, none of the Little America

personnel deposed by plaintiff5 considered there to be or
heard there was a problem with the asphalt surfaces in the
rain; slip and fall incidents were "so minimal and seldom" that

5

John Stoner, chief of security; Leendert Van Hulten, the
security officer who investigated plaintiff's fall (May 2,
1991); Don Harsh, chief maintenance officer who witnessed
plaintiff's fall and assisted her after; Rick Mills, chief
grounds officer; Al Landvatter, risk manager for Sinclair Oil;
Greg Hagelberg, a security officer who investigated a similar
incident after plaintiff's (December 22, 1991); Shawn Powis,
another security officer who investigated a similar incident
after plaintiff's (June 29, 1991); and Lee Arrington, the
security officer who investigated Sandra Walraven's incident
(April 25, 1991).
161U76S4 1
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there were never any discussions about there being a problem
with water on the asphalt.6
18.

When this accident was investigated (the day it

happened), no particular slipperiness was found on the asphalt.
(R.1189, LL.7-15)
19.

It was determined that the Little America

asphalt, in the area where plaintiff fell, was "quite an
abrasive compound..., more rocks than some asphalt does [sic],
which makes it less slippery...." (R.1213, LL.6-18)
20.

The gilsonite-based product chosen by Little

America had been recommended by a professional asphalt paving
company before the incident in question. (R.241)
21.

Little America was careful in its application,

first reading the directions (R.906, LL.8, 15); preparing the
surface by cleaning with brooms and a power sweep (R.899,
LL.14-15); applying one coat and spreading it out as far as it
would go (R.903, LL.21-22; R.907, L.21); and seeing that no
puddles formed. (R.908, LL.3-10)
22.

Rick Mills, the grounds supervisor, had done the

job once before.

Two or three members of his crew had done it

in the years before that. (R.864, LL.8-23)

6

Since these references are lengthy, they are reproduced
in the Addendum.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Plaintiff has failed to show the existence of a

dangerous condition on the Little America premises at the time
she fell.

There is no competent proof that the sealant was

making the asphalt slippery more than eight months after its
application.
2.

"Notice" is still an element of premises

liability, even when the landowner "creates" the condition that
causes the injury.

The "variant" theory of premises liability

assumes that hazardousness of the condition is apparent to the
landowner when the condition is created.
3.

The facts are undisputed that defendant neither

knew nor had reason to know there was a dangerous condition on
the Little America premises.

In all of the years that

defendant has been treating the asphalt at Little America with
sealant, there has been only one incident of someone slipping
on the asphalt in the rain.

That was Sandra Walraven, and

there was nothing about that incident to put defendant on
notice of a hazardous condition at Little America.
4.

It is not error to grant summary judgment in

negligence cases.

Cases of "simple" negligence (breach of the

required standard of care under the circumstances) usually make
for jury cases.

However, premises cases have a dual nature.

Landowners can defend on the basis of due care and also on the

161X47654 1
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basis of lack of notice.

Issues of due care may make for jury

cases, but notice issues undeniably make for summary judgment.
ARGUMENTS
I.

PLAINTIFF
BURDEN OF
COMPETENT
CONDITION
PREMISES.

HAS FAILED IN HER
COMING FORWARD WITH
PROOF OF A DANGEROUS
ON THE LITTLE AMERICA

Plaintiff slipped and fell while walking in the rain
at Little America.

Plaintiff complained that the asphalt she

was walking on was unreasonably slippery.

Originally,

plaintiff contended that she slipped on oil or automotive
grease in the parking lot.

Plaintiff recognized that such a

theory would have required her to show that Little America had
"notice" of the dangerous or defective condition. Martin v.
Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977).

When we

informed her that eight months prior to the accident the
asphalt had been treated with a sealant, she changed her theory
and said there was no oil or grease; it was the sealant that
made the asphalt unreasonably slippery.
She got a gentleman named Charles Turnbow to sign an
affidavit to that effect.

Mr. Turnbow is an attorney and

professional engineer who has been qualified "hundreds of
times" to give testimony in slip and fall cases.

Though his

resume boasts a background in chemistry, his affidavit fails to
state his experience with asphalt sealant.

161\47654 1
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Mr. Turnbow did not

visit Little America or conduct any tests of its asphalt or the
sealant that was used.

All he reviewed were the pleadings and

depositions in this case.

Based on this, Mr. Turnbow rendered

the following opinion in paragraph 7:

"For a period of time

following the application of asphalt sealant..., the surface to
which the sealant is applied will be 'slippery when wet.'"
An expert's affidavit is deficient if it fails to set
forth "the specific facts that logically support the expert's
conclusion." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah
1992).

Mr. Turnbow fails to state any facts in support of his

conclusion.

There is not even the "bare assertion" that he has

reviewed the facts and based his opinion on them, which, of
course, is totally deficient. Icl. (citing with disapproval
American Concept Insurance Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271, 274
(Utah App. 1988)).

We have no way of knowing what it is about

the sealant that was making the asphalt slippery.

An affidavit

that is deficient in this manner will not raise genuine issues
of material fact to defeat a summary judgment motion.
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d at 102.
Mr. Turnbow's opinion is also patently irrelevant.
Everyone knows that asphalt is slippery when wet.

The burden

is on plaintiff to show that the slipperiness was "extraordinary." De Weese v. J.C. Penney Company, 297 P.2d 898, 902
(Utah 1956).

There is nothing in Mr. Turnbow's affidavit to

161X47654 1

- 12 -

indicate the degree to which the sealant supposedly made the
asphalt slippery.

We should not have to presume that the

sealant made the asphalt unreasonably slippery when it rained.
The problems with Mr. Turnbow's affidavit do not stop
there.

Even if his preliminary conclusion were correct--that

the asphalt was slippery when wet because of the sealant--he
would have to show that the sealant continued making the
asphalt slippery to the day of plaintiff's accident, more than
eight months after its application.

Mr. Turnbow's affidavit

fails to address this critical point.

All he says in paragraph

9 is that Little America did nothing to "eliminate" or
"substantially ameliorate" the slippery when wet condition
supposedly created by the asphalt sealant.

That is not the

same as saying that the "slippery when wet" condition persisted
to the day of plaintiff's accident.
Mr. Turnbow goes on in paragraph 10 to say that he is
"familiar with the standard of care... for owners/operators of
facilities such as the Salt Lake City Little America (including
the parking and driving areas)" and that Little America
breached that standard of care by failing to "steam-clean" its
asphalt.

Whatever the merits of this suggestion, he once again

fails to state "specific facts that logically support [his]
conclusion."

His conclusion is that other Salt Lake City

property owners steam-clean their asphalt.

161\47654 1
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He has failed to

cite a single example.

He has failed to state what kind of

investigation he performed to verify this conclusion.

We note

that Mr. Turnbow hails from Apple Valley, California.

Nowhere

does he state that he visited Utah.

It would seem that a visit

to our city would be in order before rendering this kind of
conclusion.
In paragraph 12, Mr. Turnbow offers one final,
unsubstantiated conclusion that "the subject incident was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the failures specified in
the immediately preceding paragraph."
not say.

Why is that so?

He does

The Supreme Court has ruled that an "affidavit which

merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions and
which fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to
create an issue of fact." Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 725
(Utah 1985).

That is precisely the problem with Mr. Turnbow's

affidavit and the reason why the trial court concluded Mr.
Turnbow's affidavit "adds nothing" to the question of
defendant's knowledge of a dangerous condition.
For obvious reasons, plaintiff was reluctant to put
all of her eggs in Mr. Turnbow's basket.

Even if she cannot

state why, she wants the Court to know that the asphalt at
Little America was more slippery than any asphalt she has ever
encountered.

The problem for plaintiff is that such proof is

161N47654 1
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inadequate as a matter of law to meet a summary judgment
motion.
In Gaddis v. Ladies Literary Club, 288 P.2d 785 (Utah
1955), plaintiff complained that she slipped and fell on a
wooden stage that had been recently waxed.

She thought her

testimony about the slipperiness of the floor, coupled with
evidence of the waxing, would be sufficient to send the case to
the jury.

The Supreme Court did not agree:
On appeal, plaintiff contends that
the mere proof that a floor is slippery
creates a jury question as to whether any
application of wax to a floor is
negligent....
The majority of courts in the United
States hold that the mere application of
wax to a floor will not constitute
negligence, even though having some
tendency to make the floor more slippery.
To hold otherwise, these courts reason, is
to permit the jury to act upon speculation
and conjecture upon the plaintiff's
testimony that [s]he slipped on a floor
which [s]he deemed to have been made
excessively slippery by defendant's
application of wax.

288 P.2d at 786 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's directed verdict.
If plaintiff's testimony is "speculative" and
"conjectural," so is the testimony of her friend, Bruce Parker,
who slipped in the rain a week before and complained about

161V47654 1
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"excessive" slipperiness.
the Court in Gaddis:

The reason for this is expressed by

" [S]lipperiness is a relative term

and...the fact that a floor is slippery does not necessarily
mean that it is dangerous to walk on." 288 P.2d at 786.

What

is slippery for one may not be slippery for another.
Slipperiness alone does not connote dangerousness.
It goes without saying that there are hazards
commonly associated with living in a three-dimensional,
physical world.

One of them is precipitation:

"Owners of

stores, banks, office buildings, theaters or other buildings
where the public is invited to come on business or for pleasure
are not insurers against all forms of accidents that may happen
to any who come.

It is not the duty of persons in control of

such buildings to mop the sidewalk dry or take other steps
necessary to prevent the accumulation of moisture on the
sidewalk....11 Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d at 1141
(emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has already concluded (Martin) that
hazards commonly associated with precipitation are not
unreasonable.

Plaintiff must show that the hazards she

encountered at Little America were uncommon, in other words,
extraordinary or unreasonable.

She cannot do this through her

testimony or the testimony of her friends.
forward with objective, verifiable proof.

161\47654 1
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She must come
All she has mustered

is the affidavit of the professional witness, Charles Turnbow,
which is entirely devoid of proof.

It is also positively

irrelevant because it does nothing to establish the critical
element that the conditions at Little America were unreasonably
dangerous at the time plaintiff slipped and fell.

This Court

may affirm the ruling of the trial court since there was no
triable issue as to the dangerousness of the premises at Little
America. Rule 56(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
II.

NOTICE IS STILL AN ELEMENT OF
UTAH LAW, EVEN UNDER THE
VARIANT TO PREMISES LIABILITY.

The reason given by the trial court for granting
summary judgment was no "notice."

Plaintiff is under the

mistaken impression that notice has been excused in Utah law.
She contends that liability is established simply by showing
that Little America "created" a condition that turned out to be
dangerous, even if there were no reason for Little America to
suspect it was dangerous at the time.

We will demonstrate that

premises liability is not strict liability.

Notice is still an

element of plaintiff's case.
Plaintiff is relying on the "variant" to premises
liability first recognized in Long v. Smith Food Kind Store,
531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973).

In that case, the variant was stated

as follows:
[I]n order to impose liability for an
injury resulting from some foreign
161V47654 1

substance or defective condition it must
have existed for such time and manner that
in due care the defendant either knew or
should have known, and remedied it; and the
variant thereof, that if the condition or
defect was created by defendant himself or
his agents or employees, the notice
requirement does not apply.
531 P.2d at 361 (emphasis added).
There is no dispute that Little America created the
condition of which plaintiff complains (asphalt sealant).
the surface, it would appear that plaintiff is correct:

On
All

she need prove is that the property owner created a condition
that turned out to be dangerous.

However, a closer reading of

the cases is required.
The two leading cases, for plaintiff at least, are
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah App.
1991) and Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah
App. 1992).

The defendants in Silcox tried to escape liability

by arguing there was no evidence they had "created" the
specific condition that caused injuries.

This Court disagreed

and reversed the trial court decision granting summary
judgment.

Silcox is more important (at least in terms of this

case) for what it did not address.
It was taken for granted that the condition arguably
created by defendants was dangerous.
how anyone could disagree.

It is difficult to see

No one would deny that melting ice
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on a supermarket floor posed a hazard to shoppers.

There may

have been a question as to who created the hazard, but there
was definitely no question that the condition posed a
"foreseeable risk of harm." Silcox v. Skaaas Alpha Beta, Inc.,
814 P.2d at 624.
This point becomes clearer in Canfield.

The relevant

question was stated as whether plaintiff must show "notice of
the specific lettuce leaf upon she slipped and fell." 841 P. 2d
at 1226.

Defendant tried to escape liability by arguing that

the "specific lettuce leaf" upon which plaintiff slipped and
fell was placed there by one of its customers, so that it could
not be said to have "created" the hazardous condition.
What is significant is that once again, there was no
dispute that the specific condition was dangerous.

Nor could

there have been, given the fact that defendant "placed empty
boxes around the farmer's pack display in which customers could
place the discarded leaves," 841 P.2d at 1225, proof positive
defendant recognized there was a hazard.

The holding in the

case was appropriately narrow:
[T]here is no logical distinction between a
situation in which the storeowner directly
creates the condition or defect, and where
the storeowner's method of operation
creates a situation where it is reasonably
foreseeable that the expectable acts of
third parties will create a dangerous
condition or defect.
841 P.2d at 1226 (citation omitted).
161X47654 1
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Most significant is what is stated by the Court
immediately after:
We therefore reiterate the rule set
forth in De Weese fv. J.C. Penney Company,
297 P.2d 898], that where the storeowner
chooses a method of operation where it is
reasonably foreseeable that the expectable
acts of third parties will create a
dangerous condition, an injured party need
not prove either actual or constructive
knowledge of the specific condition. In
this type of case, notice is satisfied as a
matter of law because the storeowner is
deemed to be informed of the dangerous
condition since it adopted the method of
operation.
841 P.2d at 1226 (emphasis added).
The Court was thus excusing notice of the "specific"
condition, but not that of the general condition that allowed
the specific condition to come into play.

Notice of the

"specific" condition was satisfied as a matter of law since
defendant undeniably had notice that the general condition (its
method of operation) posed an unreasonable risk of harm to
customers, or, as the Court stated:

"It was reasonably

foreseeable that under this method of operation some leaves
would fall or be dropped on the floor by customers thereby
creating a dangerous condition." 841 P.2d at 1227 (emphasis
added).
This is where plaintiff misses the boat in this case.
Notice of the "specific" condition (slipperiness of the asphalt
20 -

on the day in question) may be excused, but there must still be
notice of the hazardousness of the general condition (asphalt
sealant producing slippery conditions eight months after its
application).

In other words, plaintiff must show that at some

time prior to her accident, Little America knew or had reason
to know that its application of asphalt sealant made the
asphalt surfaces more slippery than usual.

Anything short of

that would be strict liability.
This point is made clearer by a line of Washington
cases recognizing the same "no-notice" variant as Utah.

In

Washington, notice is excused "when the nature of the
proprietor's business and his methods of operation are such
that the existence of unsafe conditions on the premises is
reasonably foreseeable." Pimentel v. Roundup Company, 666 P.2d
888, 893 (Wash. 1983)(emphasis added).

The court was careful

to stress that this "does not change the general rule governing
liability for failure to maintain premises in a reasonably safe
condition:

the unsafe condition must either be caused by the

proprietor or his employees, or the proprietor must have actual
or constructive notice of the unsafe condition." Id.
In a case following Pimentel, the Washington Supreme
Court elaborated further:
Pimentel reaffirmed that most
plaintiffs still need to show that a
proprietor had actual or constructive
notice of an unsafe condition.... [In
16U47654 1

Pimentel w]e emphasized that this exception
did not impose strict liability or even
shift the burden to the defendant to
disprove negligence. Rather, where the
operation of a business is such that
unreasonably dangerous conditions are
continuous or reasonably foreseeable, it is
unnecessary to prove the length of time
that the dangerous condition had
existed....
Wiltse v. Albertson's Inc., 805 P.2d 793, 798 (Wash. 1991)
(emphasis added).
We agree that notice should be excused when a
landowner creates an obviously dangerous condition, a condition
that everyone agrees is an accident "waiting to happen."
However, in the absence of proof that the landowner has created
an obvious or foreseeable risk of harm, either directly or by
its method of operation, we urge the Court to adopt the
following rule:

" [T]here is no liability for harm resulting

from conditions from which no unreasonable risk was to be
anticipated,...." Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 61, p. 426
(5th ed. 1984) .
We have searched in vain for a Utah case where the
landowner did not have notice of the dangerousness of the
condition.

Koer v. Mavfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967)

is said to be the source of the variant to premises
liability.7

The Court said that if plaintiff could show "the

7

Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d at 361.
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object causing the injury was placed there by the
[storeowner],...a prima facie case for the jury is established
on the issue of negligence." 431 P.2d at 569.
this was obvious:

The reason for

No one denied "the grape on the floor was a

dangerous condition." Id.

Plaintiff lost because she did not

"sustain [] her burden of coming forward with enough evidence to
link the store in any way to the presence of the grape on the
floor." Id.
De Weese is a case decided against the landowner, but
the undisputed facts were that "defendant knew of the
characteristic of terrazzo to become slippery when wet, and
that it was its custom,...to use rubber mats or grit to prevent
slipperiness during stormy weather. 297 P.2d at 901 (emphasis
added).

Notice was satisfied by the fact that defendant had

previously recognized a hazard even though it did not know of
the specific hazard on the day in question.
Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 388 P.2d 409 (Utah
1964) is another case decided against the landowner, but it
represents yet another case where the hazard was obvious.

The

storeowner defended by arguing it had not left the cardboard
box in the supermarket aisle, and the trial court granted
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The Supreme Court

reversed, and in doing so, made the following comment about the
dangerousness of the condition:
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It is hardly open to question that
reasonable minds could believe that the
leaving of such a box in the aisle, where
people are expected to be preoccupied in
searching the shelves for groceries, would
create a hazard exposing others to an
unreasonable risk of harm. That danger to
customers is reasonably to be apprehended
from such a circumstance is shown by the
defendant's store manager,...who testified
to the care he personally observed and
urged upon his employees to keep the aisles
free of boxes and merchandise in the
interest of safety.
388 P.2d at 410.
The law is clear:

There is no liability, even under

the variant theory of premises liability, unless the landowner
"knew or should have known of the [hazardous] condition."
Silcox v. Skaqgs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d at 624.

In such a

case, notice is satisfied where the dangerous condition or
defect "was created by the defendant himself or his agents or
employees." Id.

The same holds true in the "method of

operation" cases where "the storeowner is deemed to be informed
of the dangerous condition since it adopted the method of
operation." Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d at 1226.
Under no circumstances is there liability unless the risk of
harm is "foreseeable." 814 P.2d at 624; 841 P.2d at 1227.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
CONCLUDED LITTLE AMERICA HAD NO
NOTICE OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION
ON ITS PREMISES.

Plaintiff has stated nine pages of facts in her
brief.

Plaintiff hopes to avoid the entry of summary judgment

by "burying" the Court in facts.

The problem is that none of

the facts stated by plaintiff are in dispute.

When the facts

are not in dispute (and only one conclusion can be drawn from
them) negligence becomes a question of law. Silcox v. Skaaas
Alpha Beta, Inc.. 814 P.2d at 624.

The question is whether the

trial court correctly concluded that Little America had no
notice of a dangerous condition on its premises.
Plaintiff has only mustered two facts in support of
her claim of notice.

It is undisputed that the asphalt sealant

came with application instructions, part of which said:

"On

smooth pavement, fine silica sand may be broadcast into wet
coating to increase non-slip characteristics."

It is also

undisputed that one week prior to the plaintiff's incident,
another Little America guest reported slipping and falling in
the rain.

When taken with the great many facts mustered by

Little America in support of its summary judgment, this Court
should conclude, as did the trial court, that the "'dangerous
condition' of which the plaintiff complains was one of which
the [defendant] had no knowledge nor any reason to know...."

161N47654 1

- 25 -

First of all, let us place plaintiff's two facts in
context.

She has not read all of the relevant application

instructions.

We think it important for the Court to note that

this product was perfectly appropriate for the use made of it
by Little America.

Consider the statement that the product "is

recommended for driveways, parking lots, tennis courts, school
playgrounds and other bituminous pavement surfaces."

These are

all places where people are expected to walk when it rains.
Nothing about that would put the user on notice that the
product makes surfaces slippery when wet.

The provision for

adding sand does nothing to warn of a dangerous condition.
What it says is that silica sand "may" be broadcast into the
wet coating, but note that this is to "increase the non-slip
characteristics" the product already has.

There is absolutely

nothing on the label warning about a dangerous slippery when
wet condition.
Similarly, the Sandra Walraven incident proves too
much.

Ms. Walraven fell one week before plaintiff, but she

fell in a different location.

It is undisputed that it was

"raining pretty hard" at the time.

What she reported to the

Little America guard was that "it was raining, the pavement was
slick, and I fell."

Similarly, the Little America guard did

not note a complaint of extreme slipperiness.

He reported Ms.

Walraven saying that she fell "while it was raining."
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It is a fact that Ms. Walraven ultimately lodged a complaint
about "wet, very slick pavement," but this was after
plaintiff's accident.
As for the facts mustered by Little America, it is
undisputed that in the more than eight months since Little
America applied the sealant, there had not been a single,
reported incident, other than Ms. Walraven's.

This is

significant considering the hundreds of people who cross Little
America's grounds every day, not to mention the dozens of
employees who do the same.

Add to that the fact that this was

not the first time Little America had used asphalt sealant.
The undisputed facts of this record disclose that Little
America had been treating its asphalt surfaces with sealant for
many years before the incident with plaintiff.

There had been

no reported incidents like these during that entire period of
time (at least since 1988).

It is easy to see why Little

America did not identify the Walraven incident as a problem
with its asphalt sealing operations.

It is also easy to see

why Little America did not identify a hazard with only one
reported incident of someone slipping and falling in the rain.
Surely one such incident was to be expected given the amount of
pedestrian traffic Little America sees on its asphalt parking
lots.
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We are mindful that in making this determination, the
Court must review all "facts and inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the losing party." Canfield v.
Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d at 1226.

We fail to see how that

would change the result in this case.
Sandra Walraven fell eight months after Little
America made its last application of asphalt sealant.

Surely,

given the amount of time that had passed and the absence of
similar incidents, it would not be reasonable for defendant to
infer that the asphalt sealant was creating a problem.

Nor

would it be reasonable, given the absence of slip and fall
incidents in general, for defendant to infer that there was a
problem with the asphalt in the rain.

For that to be the case,

there would have to be an epidemic of slip and falls, all over
the grounds, but that was not the case.

Hundreds of people

walk on the Little America premises every day.

The fact that

in eight months with hundreds of thousands of people walking on
the asphalt there was only one incident of someone slipping and
falling in the rain, suggests that Ms. Walraven encountered a
slick spot that was confined to the area where she fell.

There

is nothing about that incident that would indicate a serious
risk of harm, particularly considering the absence of a
complaint from her that the surface was "excessively" slippery.
Ms. Walraven herself, in her undisputed report to Little
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America, seemed to chalk her accident up to nothing more than
wet asphalt.
It is a fact that the application instructions
indicated sand could be added to "increase non-slip
characteristics."

But is it reasonable to infer that Little

America knew it was gambling with the safety of its guests when
it failed to use the sand?

What reason was there for Little

America to use the sand when it had made the same application
many years running without incident?
Granting summary judgment is not an unusual precedent
The Washington Court of Appeals8

in slip and fall cases.

ruled that a similar question ("whether the operating
procedures of a defendant's store are such that unreasonably
dangerous conditions are continuous or reasonably foreseeable")
was a question of law to be decided by the court. Coleman v.
Ernst Home Center, Inc., 853 P.2d 473, 476 (Wash. App.
1993)(citation omitted).

This would follow from our Supreme

Court's recent affirmation that duty is a question of law to be
determined by the court. Hunsaker v. State of Utah, 870 P.2d
893, 897 (Utah 1993).

In all instances, the trial court made

the right conclusions from the facts admitted and should be
affirmed.

8

Following the Pimentel line of cases discussed above.
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IV.

IT IS NOT ERROR TO GRANT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN NEGLIGENCE
CASES.

Plaintiff spends a great deal of time in her brief
trying to convince the Court that summary judgment should never
be granted in negligence cases.

She relies on the principle,

oft-times stated, that "[s]ummary judgment should be granted
with great caution in negligence cases." Williams v. Melbv, 699
P.2d at 725.

There is no reason to dispute that, since this is

not a case of simple negligence.

This is a case of premises

liability, and premises cases require more than a showing of
simple negligence.

They require a showing of "notice," and

notice is a proper subject of summary judgment even if
negligence is not.
The dual nature of premises cases is well illustrated
by one of the cases cited by plaintiff, Canfield v. Albertsons,
Inc., 841 P.2d 1224.

Plaintiff slipped and fell on a lettuce

leaf on a supermarket fl oor.

Albertsons defended on the basis

that it had no notice of the lettuce leaf.

The Court of

Appeals reversed because Albertsons had created a situation
where it was reasonably foreseeable that customers would drop
lettuce leaves on the floor, thus satisfying the notice
requirement.

The Court said that the "relevant question is

whether Albertsons took reasonable precautions to protect
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customers against the dangerous condition it created." 841 P.2d
at 1227.
In other words, Albertsons was permitted to defend,
even though it had notice of the dangerous condition, on the
basis that it had exercised due care.
of simple negligence.

This then was a question

The Court of Appeals said summary

judgment should not have been granted on the negligence
question because "the determination of reasonableness, and
negligence, lies within the province of the jury." Canfield,
841 P.2d at 1227.

However, the Court was quick to add, just as

we have argued above, that " [q]uestions involving
reasonableness and negligence 'become questions of law...when
the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion can be drawn
from them. ' " Id. (quoting Silcox v. Skacrcrs Alpha Beta, Inc..
814 P.2d at 624).
This case is to be distinguished from the cases cited
by plaintiff.

Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570

(Utah App. 1994) was a "breach of duty" case.

Defendant moved

for summary judgment arguing that it had no duty to install a
fire sprinkler system.

The Court ruled that "reasonable minds

could differ on whether the standard of care...required more
than simple compliance with the building code, given the
particular circumstances of this case." .Id. at 575 (emphasis
added) .
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Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah
App. 198 9) involved a claim that defendant "breached its duty
as trustee under the trust deed in reconveying [plaintiff's]
interest without her actual authorization." 780 P.2d at 825.
The Court ruled that summary judgment is inappropriate unless
the applicable standard of care is "fixed by law" and
"reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the
defendant's negligence under the circumstances." Id. (citations
omitted).
Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah App. 1989) is
a case where the historical rule of "open and obvious danger"
was used by defendant as a total bar to liability.

The rule

was abolished as being incompatible with Utah's comparative
negligence scheme. 780 P.2d at 1279.

The case is inapplicable

because we are not claiming any comparative negligence on
plaintiff's part.

Similarly, we are not claiming that the

standard of care of a hotel owner for the safety of its patrons
on asphalt driveways has been "fixed by law" or that
"reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the
defendant's negligence under the circumstances."
Plaintiff cited one "sealant" case from Ohio, Kovach
v. Repasky, 1991 Lexis 1897 (Ohio App.)

Without attempting a

canvass of Ohio law, it would appear that there is no notice
requirement, at least none that appears in the case.
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The facts

of that case are also inapplicable.

It is possible that it

rained for the first time on the day plaintiff slipped and
fell.

The sealant in question was applied thirty days before

the incident.

An "oily residue" was apparent on the surface of

the parking lot.

There was such a build-up of sealant that

plaintiff's shoes and clothes were soiled in the fall.
Plaintiff had walked on this particular surface many times
before and had never encountered such slipperiness.
basis of these facts, summary judgment was reversed.

On the
In doing

so, the court noted that questions of "proximate cause" and
"breach of duty" were particularly fact-sensitive.

None of the

other cases cited by plaintiff involved asphalt sealant.
If we must look outside the State of Utah for
relevant authority, there are two cases we would recommend.
Cohn v. Florida National Bank at Orlando, 223 So.2d 767 (Fla.
App. 1969) is a case where plaintiff claimed to have slipped
and fallen on wet asphalt sealant.

The case was tried before

a jury, and the trial court granted defendant's motion for
directed verdict.

The proof was that the asphalt sealant had

been applied one year prior to the accident.

Plaintiff's

expert admitted never having run any tests to determine if what
was on plaintiff's boot was asphalt sealant.

The expert

admitted that he could not determine if the sealant that was
applied by defendant was slippery.
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Significantly, the court

noted that "[t]here was no testimony that the defendant had
actual knowledge of a dangerous condition." 223 So.2d at 768.
On the basis of the foregoing, the court ruled as follows:
There is nothing in the above or
elsewhere in the record to indicate that
the sealer was applied wrongfully or that
its being placed upon the lot for the use
of invitees was a negligent act. There is
no evidence that the sealer was dangerously
slippery when wet. The recommendations of
the expert that sealer not be used or that
sand be used in the sealer for pedestrian
walkways, is not evidence that the sealer
in question was dangerous or that the
parking lot was not a reasonably safe place
on which to walk.
Accordingly, the trial court was affirmed. Id.
In another case, Chambers v. Arnold, 1989 Lexis 554
(Tenn. App.), summary judgment for the landowner was affirmed.
The claim was that plaintiff slipped and fell on an asphalt
driveway that had been recently sealed.

The proof was that it

had been "several months" since the sealant had been applied.
Plaintiff was wearing leather-soled shoes and slipped and fell
as he ran around the corner of his truck.

The only proof from

plaintiff was his testimony (and that of his son) that the
driveway was "quite slick."

The court ruled that this

"statement standing alone,...does not create 'a genuine issue
for trial.'"
We agree that the "reasonableness" of defendant's
precautions in this case would not make for summary judgment.
- 34 -

However, it is clear that "notice" cases, unlike negligence
cases, do make for summary judgment:

Martin v. Safeway Stores

Inc., 565 P.2d 1139; Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538
P.2d 175 (Utah 1975); Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d
360; Howard v. Auerbach Company, 437 P.2d 895 (Utah 1968); Koer
v. Mavfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566; Gaddis v. Ladies Literary
Club, 288 P.2d 785; Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Corporation, 284
P.2d 477 (Utah 1955).

Three of these were summary judgment

cases (Allen, Long and Howard), and the others were cases of
directed verdicts for defendant.

However, the standard for

directed verdicts is the same as that for summary judgment. Nay
v. General Motors Corporation, GMC Truck Division, 850 P.2d
1260, 1264 (Utah 1993).
We agree that a duty of reasonable care is imposed in
all cases of landowner liability. Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed
Company, 265 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Utah 1954).

But that is not to

say, as plaintiff suggests, that all "common law distinctions"
of landowner liability have been abolished. See Donahue v.
Durfee, supra (noting that common law distinctions have been
abolished in one case, that of landlord/tenant). 780 P.2d at
1277 (citing Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d at 726). Plaintiff
herself relies on one such common law distinction, that of the
"business invitee," which was recently avowed by this Court in
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Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App.
1993) .
A duty of reasonable care under the circumstances has
not abolished plaintiff's common law burden of proving the
existence of a "dangerous" condition or "notice" of that
condition on defendant's part.

Else, why would this Court say,

as it did in Silcox, that it is "well settled in this state
that...it must be shown that the owner or occupier knew, or by
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, of the
existence of a dangerous condition." 814 P.2d at 624.

The Utah

Supreme Court has never disavowed its ruling in Martin v.
Safeway Stores Inc.9 that notice is the "essential inquiry
relating to defendant's negligence...." 565 P.2d at 1140.
Notice is obviously still a condition of liability under Utah
law.

Plaintiff gets to her negligence question only after

getting past the notice requirement.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is wrong when she says "[t]his case
involves questions of the reasonableness of Little America's
acts and omissions in connection with the hazardous condition
that caused Mrs. Weinstein's injuries." (Page 14)

Questions of

"reasonableness" arise only after plaintiff has established (1)
the "dangerousness" of the condition supposedly causing those

9

Coming years after Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed Company.
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injuries and (2) "notice" of that condition on defendant's
part.

Plaintiff may have raised genuine issues as to

reasonableness, but defendant was not moving for summary
judgment on reasonableness.

Plaintiff's case fails because she

failed to adduce competent evidence that there was a
"dangerous" condition on the Little America premises or that
defendant "knew or should have known" of that condition.
Notice and dangerousness are essential elements of plaintiff's
case.

Summary judgment is appropriate because plaintiff cannot

prevail on these elements.
Respectfully submitted, this 23rd day of November,
1994.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
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3
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6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Q.

Let's talk about this Walraven incident again

for a minute.
Do you recall it ever occurring to you,

14
15

between the time of the Walraven incident and the time

16

of the Weinstein incident a week later, that there might

17

be a hazard of some kind out there associated with the

18

asphalt surface, especially associated when rain water

19

was sitting on top of it?
MR. DALTON:

20
21
22

Q.

(By Mr. Collins)

What point in time?
In the interim between the

Walraven and Weinstein incident.

23

A.

No, sir.

24

Q.

As you sit here today, has it ever occurred

25

to you that there might be a hazard, or in the past, has
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES, INC.

C0954

1

been a hazard associated with the surface of the asphalt

2

parking area and rain water sitting on top of it?

3

that ever occurred to you that there might be something

4

hazardous about that?

5

A.

Wet pavement?

6

Q.

Wet —

7
8

yeah.

We'll get to that.

Has

The wet

asphalt surface out there at any time?
A.

No, sir.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES, INC.

00955
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Van

MUX^en

Q.

\ LAaiuinauj.un

oy

ni .

v,unj.na ;

Do you agree with the proposition

that,

just from your experience around here or maybe your
experience

in life generally, that asphalt

slippery when it's wet?

Do you agree with

gets
that

propos it ion?
A.

Correct.

So does concrete.

So does

all

kinds of surfaces.
Q.
asphalt
that

I imagine you have walked on a lot of wet
in your life other than what you see here; ::

right?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Based on your experience, is there

anything

more or less slippery about the asphalt surface

here

than on other asphalt surfaces that you have walked
on when it's been wet, when they have been wet?
A,

Not from my experience.

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
(801 ) 521-5222

01197

Q.

Have you ever participated

in any meetings

or any discussions, even just a one-to-one
discussion, with any of your security

informal

worker

colleagues or anybody else here at Little America
about how Little America might address at all this
problem of people slipping and falling and
hurt on the wet
A.

getting

asphalt?

No, we haven't.

seldom, it never happened.

It's so minimal and so
To my knowledge, it never

come up.

Q.

Okay.

From where you sat or stood in the

corporation, did you view it as just one of those
things that happens that you can't do anything

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
( 801 ) 521-5222

01202

about?
MR. DALTON:

I'll

object to the extent

the

question's vague and ambiguous, but you can answer if
you

understand.
Q.

In fact, yes, why don't you answer that one

first?
A.

Well, really no, no, for the simple

that you figure four incidences

in 15 years, you

probably during that 15 years have moved
people back and forth around there.
a policy against something like that?
happening.

reason

10,000,000

How can you make
It's not

And the person falling, we can't

even

point -- in my investigation, I can't even point to
anything that caused

it.

The person could

tripped over her own foot, could have been

have
looking

the wrong way, stumbled.

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
(801 ) 521-5222

01203

Q.

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B Let me get back to this case.

Have

you even thought about this subject matter in
connection with the situation here at Little America
prior to my asking you about it; that is, the
advisability of posting the signs?
A.

No, I have n^t.

Q.

It never occurred to you in this

particular

plant to post them, correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Okay.

What about, has it ever occurred

to

you or are you aware of any discussions at any time
before or after this accident about changing

the

surface, the asphalt surface, roughing

it up to make

it less slippery or putting in a rough

concrete

sidewalk or sidewalks to make it less hazardous
people walking on the wet surface?
occurred

for

Has that ever

to you?

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
(801) 521-5222

01208

A.

No, it has not.

Q.

And you've never heard of any

about that
A.

discussions

either?
No, I have not.

That would come

under

maintenance and would not come to us.
Q.

That would be somebody else's

up with something
A.

No.

like that?

job to come

Is that the

idea?

If it was to be done or discussed,

would probably not be discussed with security.
would be discussed with the maintenance
Q.

it

It

department.

Are you as a person who is concerned

the overall safety of this place, including

about

the

safety of patrons, if something occurs to you, are
you expected to pass it on as a good idea
management

for

to consider?
MR. DALTON:

Object to the extent it calls

for speculation, but you can answer.
A.

It's never been brought up.

Q.

Never occurred to you, correct?

A.

I might pass something on once in a while

when I see something that I think should be
corrected, yes.
Q.

This idea of a safer or less

slippery

walkway when it's wet, this hasn't occurred to you
before, has it?

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222
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A.

No, it has not.

Q.

Are you aware of any reason why that would

not be a good idea to do something like that here?
A.

Like I said, to me it seems pointless

with

the lack of problem that's there.
Q.

Let me rephrase that.

From where you sit,

the incidents of people slipping and falling and
getting hurt on the asphalt surfaces here are so rare
that it wouldn't warrant the work to be done to go
further towards eliminating the problem?
MR. DALTON:
extent

Well, I'll

it mischaracterizes.

object to the

I don't want that to be

an all-inclusive question, but you can go ahead

and

answer.
A.

I don't see the benefit per se from my

viewpoint.

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
( 801 ) 521-5222

01210

Q.

Have you personally ever slipped or fallen

or lost your balance out there on that asphalt since
you have been working here?
A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

Approximately how many times?

A.

Maybe two or three times.

When I was

running on ice, I fell.
Q.

Okay.

Let's throw out the ice.

A.

Okay.

On water, no.

Q.

Has anybody else, any other of the Little

America employees to your knowledge had that kind of
experience, where they've either to your knowledge
actually gone down without getting hurt or almost
gone down but saved themselves?
A.

Not if they haven't reported it to us,

won't be aware of it.
Q.

I don't mean just official incident

reports, I mean just guys shooting the breeze about
conditions.
A.

Not that I'm aware.

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222

01211
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zo

Harsh

(Examination By Mr. Collins)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Q.

To your knowledge, has there ever been any

15

talk here in Little America management circles or

16

lower than that among any group of people here

17

building sidewalks

18

to sidewalks earlier -- building sidewalks that

19

a concrete surface for people to use, making

20

easier

21

walking across asphalt on rainy days when the

asphalt

22

surface is wet?

to your

23

knowledge?

24

A.

25

of, no.

-- to follow up on your

about

reference

it

for people to get to their rooms, rather

Has that ever been mentioned

have

than

Not -- hasn't been talked about that I know

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
(801) 521-5222

Harsh

(Examination By Mr.
Q.

loinns)

Have you ever seen any pieces of paper,

memos or anything that say anything

like that?

A.

No .

Q.

Let me jubi point something out to you.

I

think it's fair to say that in this case Little
America has acknowledged, has in a straightforward
manner come out and said, in a formal paper or two,
"Yes, we know that the asphalt surface on our parking
area," including the general area where my client
fell, "gets slippery when it's wet outside."
Do you agree with that
A.

Yeah.

Okay.

proposition?

Asphalt seems to ~2t slippery when

it gets wet, yes.
Q.
of that.

All right.

Let's talk about your

knowledge

When you say asphalt gets slippery when

it's wet, this is something you've known for years,
correct?

And I realize that some of my questions may

sound a little silly to you, but for the record,
let's -A.

Yeah, I guess that's true.

Q.

All right.

And asphalt as a general

proposition gets slippery when wet, you've known that
for years, right, not just asphalt here at the Little
America?
True

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
(801) 521-5222
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Harsh

(Examination By Mr. Collins)
Q.

Is that

correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Has it ever occurred to you before or after

this accident on May 2, 1991 just from your
familiarity with this particular plan that the
asphaltic surface here, including the general

area

where it's been reported to you that my client
is any more slippery or less slippery than
asphalt surfaces with which you have been
with in your

fell,

other
familiar

lifetime?

MR. DALTON:

Do you understand

the

question?
THE WITNESS:

Well, I think so.

A.

I don't notice any difference.

Q.

Asphalt's asphalt as far as you are

concerned?
A.

Yes .

Q.

It gets slippery when wet; is that

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

correct?

Has there ever been any talk to your

knowledge since you've been working here, either
before or after this accident involving my client,

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
(801 ) 521-5222

C1C79

Harsh

(Examination By Mr.

comnsj

about the advisability or lack of advisability of
posting signs in conspicuous

locations

informing

people that, I don't know the exact words that matter
to me, but informing people of the fact that this
asphalt in this area where they might be walking

gets

slippery when wet and informing people that they
should be extra careful of that?

Has there ever been

any talk of that?
A.

Nothing to my knowledge.

Q.

Let me just ask this for the record.

think it follows from what you said.

There

been any talk as far as you know about the

I

hasn't
relative

cost or lack of cost from posting a few signs

saying

that for whatever good that might do?
A.

Not to my knowledge, no.

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
( 801 ) 521-5222
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Prior to the time that you saw

Ms. Weinstein in the spot you have located, had you
heard from any source in Little America or, for that

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
(801) 521-5222

01090

Harsn

(Examination py ni . v,uxixa J;

matter, had you seen anything, any accident

involving

people falling on slippery asphalt in the asphalt
surfaces anywhere in this complex and getting hurt,
however seriously or nonseriously?
MR. DALTON:

Before hers.

A.

No, I'm not aware of any.

Q.

Had you ever yourself slipped, whether you

fell or not, either an accident or a near accident,
where you either had to catch yourself or almost went
down anywhere on the asphalt surfaces here before
that

happened?
A.

Not on the asphalt surface, no.

Q.

Had you heard of or seen any of your

co-employees having such an experience here before
the accident

happened?

A.

Not that I recall.

Q.

Never heard anybody just casually

say,

"Man, it's slippery out there today," or anything
like that?
A.

Not outside.

In the wintertime, of course,

when you have a little snow and ice before we can get
it off, y e s , then.
Q.

But not on a, quote/unquote, "slippery when

wet" asphalt
A.

I've done that.

surface?

No, not the asphalt surface.

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
( 801 ) 521-5222
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14

Q.

What about instances where people have fallen

15

on wet asphalt out there, not ice or snow?

16

what we 7 re talking about in this lawsuit or this

17

incident involving Sharon Weinstein, are you aware of

18

any instances, either by direct observation or from

19

reports that have come to you from any sources, are you

20

aware of other instances where people have fallen out

21

there?

22

A.

I've not seen any.

Other than

When we first discussed

23

this case, M r . Landvatter informed m e there were a

24

couple of other instances.

25

Q.

Other than what M r . Landvatter has told you,

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES, INC.

CO 858

1

are you —

have reports come to you before or since of

2

other people falling out there?
MR. DALTON:

3

Have you heard of any other

4

such instances other than this one, other than what Al

5

told you?

6

THE WITNESS:

Not on wet asphalt, no.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES, INC.

00859

32

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Q.

The purpose, if I understand, of this

15

resurfacing in '90 was to —

16

you used exactly —

I can't remember the term

rejuvenate the asphalt, preserve it?

17

A.

Right.

18

Q.

Was there ever any discussion you recall

19

having with anybody here, your workers, your crewmen or

20

higher management, about any safety considerations with

21

respect to the type of resurfacing or resealing

22

substance that ought to be put down?

23

A.

I don't recall ever having —

I don't know

24

bringing up a problem or an objection or even a

25

complaint about anyone having a problem with the asphalt
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES, INC.

C0910

1

surface.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Q.

(By Mr. Collins)

Did it ever occur to you

11

that there might be safer substances in terms of not

12

being as slippery when wet than the stuff that you

13

actually put down in '90?

14

A.

15

time or not.

16

Q.

17
18

I don't recall if it occurred to me at that

Has it ever since then occurred to you since

you put it down?
A.

I've never experienced a problem on the

19

asphalt surfaces.

I'm sure there is minute variations

20

between different types of sealers and the amounts of

21

traction that is left on the surface.

22
23
24
25
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES, INC.

C0911

17

here.

18

through the parking lot, maybe they would find too much

19

traction and stumble.

20

I don't know.

Q.

Somebody with tennis shoes jogging

I don't know.

In any event, in your resurfacing decision,

21

the selection of the materials that you used in '90, you

22

didn't take any of that into consideration, did you?

23

A.

I felt like I chose a product that was a good

24

product.

And, y o u know, I didn't s e e any reason t o —

25

having n o t had problems with that type of thing
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES, INC.

—
CQ913

1

Q.

Right.

2

A.

—

3

I didn't see any reason to use somethina

else.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES, INC.
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Lanavatter

Q.

(hxamination By Mr. Collins)

H H H

T e

H

me

*-n Y o u r

own

a person who has some involvement

words why you as

in the safety of

the plant here have no plans, if I understand

your

testimony correctly, to do something to remedy what
appears to me to be an ongoing situation or problem
in this

regard.

A.

The reason is, when you consider there were

four instances
monitoring

in the 11 years that I have been

it, that's an awfully, awfully

infinitesimal

percentage, and going on the

assumption

that people were just careless to some degree or
other regarding
sympathetic

-- regardless of whether

I was

of their problem or not, I felt that

somehow they were careless, and therefore

felt no

necessity to take action, because we have 2,300
people a day at minimum wandering around on the
premi ses.
Q.

How do you come to that

calculation?

A.

Klaus Kelterborn, who has been referred

and I reviewed records, and you can check

to,

the

restaurant records, the meals sold and then the
number of guests that we have, and we averaged

out

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
( 801 ) 521-5222

01239

Lanqvatcer
1
2
3

about

(txaminaixmi py ru. . v-<•/J. x J. m /

2,300.
Q.

2,300 reported persons per day doing

something on the premises

here?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

That's residents, and what do you call the

6

people who pay overnight, guests?

7

A.

Yes, uh-huh.

8

Q.

Guests and restaurant patrons

9

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

And you don't have any idea, do you,

together?

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Mr. Landvatter, as to how many people there might be

22

who have slipped and fallen and maybe have gotten

23

hurt but who haven't reported

24

it hadn't been serious

25

A.

it to anybody

betauac

enough?

No.

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222

01240

bdiiuvdLLsr

1

Q.

( tLxamina^ion

cy n r .

LUIIIII&I

And you don't have any idea about how many

2

people have slipped and fallen and haven't

3

hurt at all and haven't reported

4

you?

5

A.

6

gotten

it to anybody, do

No.
May I interject a thought

there?

7

Q.

Sure.

8

A.

I have told our people in meetings

9

That's fine.
that

even if an incident doesn't seem to be serious and

10

will never cause any problem

11

still to notify me.

12

facilities, not all of them, but this one has been

13

very good to report even the simplest type of

14

incidents that never ever develop into anything.

15

Q.

in any way, they are

And the hotel here and

other

That depends on the vigilance, first of

16

all, the knowledge of persons that an incident has

17

occurred,

correct?

18

A.

Right.

19

Q.

And then it depends also on the degree of

20

seriousness with which the person on duty takes

21

part of his job duties to report it, correct?

22

people might not bother; is that

23

A.

that
Some

correct?

They might not, I have to agree, but they

24

have instructions

25

report.

regardless to give me an

incident

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
( 801 ) 521-5222

01241

Landvatter

(Examination By Mr. Collins)

There seems to be from your company an
acceptance of the proposition that asphalt is
slippery when wet.

Do you agree with

that

propos it ion?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay,

And you also agree with the

proposition, do you not, that this company, Little
America, by and through its agents knew prior to the
time this accident happened that asphalt

gets

slippery when wet?
A.

Yes .

Q.

Okay.

And I gather also from some other

answers to interrogatories

I've

seen that I'm

in the

process of following up on right now formally, that
you take the position, you meaning Little America, in
this lawsuit take the position that it's a matter of
common knowledge, quote/unquote, "that asphalt gets
slippery when wet"; is that
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

correct?

Had you heard from any source -- and

forgive me if I've

asked you this.

have.

Let me back off.

Excuse me.

I don't think I

We've talked about these incidents that you
are aware of of people falling and getting hurt here,

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
(801) 521-5222

C1248

^Adiumation

By Mr. Collins)

and I think we've established that you likely had
personal knowledge of the Walraven incident of April
25th, the week before my client fell and got hurt,
correct?
A.

Yes,

Q.

And I think we've also established

prior to my client's

that

injury, you were unaware of any

other reports of an injury in a slip and

fall

accident here, correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Okay.

Prior to the time that my client got

hurt here on May 2, 1991, were you aware either

from

your own personal experience or from reports that had
been made to you by employees here of the fact that
the asphalt here got slippery when wet and you had to
be sort of careful not to slip and fall out
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

occasions

there?

I take it you had on numerous

in the years that you have been working

Little America, I take it that you have had

for

occasion

to walk somewhere on the asphaltic surface here when
it was wet; is that

correct?

A.

Yes, many times.

Q.

Okay.

And what I'm trying to get at, it

seems like there is a couple of different

things

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222

01249

Landvatter

ay

(Examinanon

going on here.

mr.

LUIIUIS)

One, well, before this accident

ever

occurred with Sharon Weinstein, because maybe you or
she or anybody else who knows about her incident is
going to be extra careful walking out there when

it's

wet, but prior to the time that she got hurt, did you
walk with what you would characterize as extra care,
an extra degree of carefulness on
here, the asphalt

the surface out

surface?

A.

Here or anywhere when it's wet.

Q.

Okay.

And did you make any distinction

in

your walking on wet surface experience, predate May
2, 1991 walking on wet surface experience, did you
make any difference between asphalt let's say on the
one hand and concrete on the other or wood or grass
or dirt or any other kind of
MR. DALTON:

surface?

In terms of their

slippery

propens ity?
MR. COLLINS:

Yes, in terms of their

slippery when wet qualities.
MR. DALTON:

I guess consequently, can you

di st ingui sh?
THE WITNESS:
whenever something

Yeah, I understand, and

is wet, I am careful, and I figure

people have to be, whether it's grass or something
else, or wood or cement.

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC
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(Examination By Mr. Collins)

Exclusive of anything that Mr. Dalton has told you or
anything that anybody else has told you in his
presence, have you heard of any other incidents

here

at Little America where people have fallen on
slippery when wet asphalt
MR. DALTON:

outside?

Just so you're clear, we may

have discussed other incidents

like this when we met,

but what he wants to know is outside of that meeting,
have you heard about any of these other kind of
incidents .
A.

Just when Stoner called me and told me I

had this appointment to come in because a woman has
slipped and

failed.
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And I think you've in essence

answered this, but is it your testimony or is it your
recollection that you hadn't heard of any other

slips

and falls out there in the parking area before the
one that you investigated

involving M s . Lauer at any

time or at any place?
MR. DALTON:
ice- and snow-related.

And I think he's

excluding

I think we're talking wet

asphalt.
Is that fair to say?
MR. COLLINS:

Right, right.
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(Examination By Mr. Collins)

A.

None.

No wet asphalt type, no.

Q.

(By Mr. Collins)

Okay.

Did you ever go to

any meetings or have you ever gone to any meetings
here dealing with safety concerns either that you've
initiated or that Mr. Stoner or anybody else has
initiated where security guys, part-time

I guess

because that's all you are, and full-time guys, get
together and talk about various safety
A.

concerns?

In our staff meeting with John Stoner

we have periodically

that

--
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ay

mx .

m i i i n a j

sorry for interrupting.

You were going

to tell me what happened at those meetings.
A-

On a couple of those meetings that I have

been here throughout the years, he's told u s , if we
see a problem that's a potential hazard or something
like that, to let the proper people know so it can be
dealt with before even someone gets hurt or
something.
Q.
kind of

Before someone gets hurt again in the same
incident?

A.

I didn't say again.

So that no one gets

Q.

Did you consider this instance of her

hurt.

falling, Ms. Lauer falling in the spot that she did,
did you consider that to be a safety

hazard?

A.

No.

Q.

I take it you haven't brought it up in any

meeting since then, have you?
A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever heard anybody at any of these

safety meetings that you have gone to address
matter of people slipping and falling on wet

the
asphalt?

A.

No.

Q.

Why is it from your perspective that you --

if it's fair for me to say this, I think it is --
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1

that you said that you are of the view that this did

2

not present a safety hazard, whatever the

3

was that caused her to fall in that

4

A.

5

not a safety

puddle?

You're asking my opinion why I think

it's

hazard?

MR. DALTON:

6

condition

Yes.

7

Q.

Yes.

8

A.

Well, because it's fairly level ground and

9

the puddle was caused by a small indentation, you

10

know, with the settling of the asphalt.

That

11

appeared

12

know, if she had something

13

see where she was walking, couldn't --

14

she could have slipped that way, which if she was

15

paying attention to what she was doing, then she

16

probably wouldn't have slipped, or if she didn't

17

items in her hands.

-- that's what it appeared to me.
in her arms and

And, you
couldn't

conceivably

have

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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I guess what I'm trying to get at is, from

what your earlier answer is, I gather that you
thought something about the particular nature of her
slip and fall, that is, in a puddle, and when she had
her arms full of things caused you to think it wasn't
a hazard; is that

correct?

A.

A hazard

Q.

Yes, right.

A.

Yeah, it wasn't a hazard

standpoint
Q.

from the asphalt

standpoint?

from the

from the asphalt.
I'm sorry.

I have taken a number of these

depositions and things are kind of running together a
little bit, so I want you to sort of be vigilant.
don't want you to admit that you said
somebody else told me.

I

something

Just feel free to correct me

on that.
Have you, yourself, ever had

problems

slipping on the asphalt here when it's wet?
A.

Yes .

Q.

How many

A.

I've

occasions?

slipped two or three times when

it's

been icy and snowy out.
Q.

Right.

And I mean just when it's been wet

from rain puddling, rain or melting ice or just

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
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1

whatever, just when you've got water either in a

2

puddle or out of a puddle but not snow or ice, have

3

you ever slipped on that kind of a surface here?

4

A.

Not that I can recall just water.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Q.

flHHB

ay Mr. Collins)

Prior to the time that this

incident

happened on June 30, 1991, had you been aware of any
other incidents where people had reported
had slipped and fallen and suffered any

that

they

injuries,

however major or minor, on the asphalt parking

and

driving surface here at Little America, any part
thereof?
A.

No.

Q.

H e ; abCuL aiLei

ever hear about any such
A.

uhib one Happened?

Did you

incident?

I don't remember any, no.
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Had you personally ever had any mishaps,

slips and falls or near falls walking on the asphalt
pavement around here outside when the asphalt
pavement was wet?
A.

No.

Q.

And had you heard of or seen any other

Little America employees having such mishaps, whether
they resulted

in actual falls or injuries or not?

A.

No, I don't -- I don't -- I can think of

Q.

Did you have what you considered to be a

none
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L.

management position while you were here at the time
this accident

happened?

A.

Yes .

Q.

The one of Mr. Grabb's wife?

A.

Yes .

Q.

Let me put it this way:

Had you prior to

that date at any time heard of or initiated

any

discussions geared toward making the situation more
safe for patrons of Little America with respect to
walking on the asphalt surface when it was rainy and
the surface was wet?
A.

No, I didn't participate

in any such

discuss ions.
Q.

Did you have any reason to think based on*-

anything you had heard or seen that there was
anything hazardous about the asphalt surface here at
Little America when it was wet?
A.

No.
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(Examination By Mr. Collins)

I did think of one other area I need to ask
you about, Shaun.

Excuse me.

Based on your own experience, I think
you've told me that you never had any near slip and
fall kind of mishaps here on this asphalt when it was
wet, did you?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Have you ever had that kind of

on any asphalt when it's wet

experience

anyplace?

A.

No .

Q.

Do you know one way or another

whether

asphalt is typically or always, quote/unquote,
"slippery when wet"?
A.

No, I don't know.
MR. COLLINS:

I --

That's okay.

That's all the questions

I have.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
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Q.

Forgive me if I've

investigated
think

I've

asked this, but have you

any other slip and fall outside?

I

asked you this question.

A.

No, I haven't.

Q.

I'm

interested

really in what the

situation

was a couple of years ago more than I am now, you
know, about when this accident happened, but if
things happened pretty much the same way now as they
did then, which
talking

is the impression

I'm

getting

from

to you and other witnesses, maybe it makes

more sense to talk to you in the present tense.
Do you have meetings with you and the other
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1

security guys about incidents

2

you could perhaps do to make things safer?

3

ever

4
5
6

that happen and what
Does

happen?
A.

Oh, we have meetings probably once

every

second month.
Q.

How do these come up?

is it something

7

happens?

8

Who decides and what causes those things to come

9

together?

10

that

A.

Do you ever suggest that you get

that

together?

Well, every so often they have a meeting

11

maybe, Stoner usually does, usually when we have a

12

lot of break-ins

13

sooner, a little more often, and when they are

14

hitting us for thefts, we have a meeting

15
16

Q.

in certain areas, we have to check

about that.

Do you recall ever having a meeting about,

you know, people slipping and falling

outside?

17

A.

We haven't.

18

Q.

Do you agree with the proposition

19
20

that

asphalt gets slippery when it's wet?
A.

I have never seen it slippery.

21

walking this for four years now.

22

seen it slippery

23

really

Q.

I been

The only time I

is snow and ice.

So you never yourself

had an

experience

24

walking around on the asphalt surface out there where

25

you thought it was slippery,

correct?
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A.

Correct, except in the wintertime.

Q.

Right.

A.

Okay.

Q.

Has it ever been reported

And I mean when it's w e t , not icy.

to you by any of

your -- and I mean official reporting.

Have any of

your fellow security guys or any other employee

here

ever remarked within your earshot that it was
slippery out there when it was wet?
A.

No .

Q.

What about just in your experience as a guy

who has been around
ever occurred

for quite a few years?

to you just walking around

Has it

asphalt

surfaces that they get slippery when wet?
A.

I'm

always careful when it is raining, but

I haven't noticed
Q.

it being

slippery.

I guess you have no reason to think

there is anything more or less slippery about

that
the

asphalt surface out here than asphalt surfaces at
large, do you?
A.

No .
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